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ABSTRACT
Plea bargaining and guilty pleas are intrinsically incompatible
with the most commonly-accepted substantive and procedural prem-
ises of American criminal justice: Plea bargaining routinely results
in punishment disproportionate to desert, and guilty pleas are an
insult to procedural due process. This Article argues that the only
way to align plea bargaining with our criminal justice premises is to
change those premises. It imagines a system in which retribution is
no longer the lodestar of punishment, and in which party-control of
the process is no longer the desideratum of adjudication. If, instead,
plea bargaining were seen as a mechanism for implementing a sen-
tencing regime focused primarily on individual crime prevention
rather than retributionas in the salad days of indeterminate sen-
tencingand if it were filtered through a system that is inquisitorial
(that is, judicially-monitored) rather than run by the adversaries, it
would have a greater chance of evolving into a procedurally coherent
mechanism for achieving substantively accurate results.
* Christopher Slobogin, Milton Underwood Professor of Law. The author would like to
thank participants in the University of Chicago Law School Public Law workshop series and
Brandon Garrett, Nancy King, Eric Luna, and Jenia Iontcheva Turner for their comments on
this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining and guilty pleas are intrinsically incompatible
with the most commonly-accepted premises of American criminal
justice. The practice of negotiating an admission of guilt in exchange
for a lowered charge or sentence cannot be reconciled with either a
retributively-based criminal law or an open, confrontational pro-
cedure. It inevitably results in sentences or the threat of sentences
that are disproportionate to desert, using a process that ignores the
panoply of constitutional rights that are viewed as the linchpin of
American justice.1
In light of this countrys high crime rates and the expense of its
trials, plea bargaining may be a necessary institution.2 But if so,
it would ideally function in a manner that is as congruent as
possible with the criminal justice systems goals. Unfortunately, re-
structuring plea bargaining so that it better fits the retributive and
adversarial tenets of American criminal justice is impossible.
Defendants will not agree to a plea offer unless they can be assured
the resulting sentence will be less harsh than what they would
receive after conviction at trial, a dynamic that seriously under-
mines the retributive notion that there is a single just punishment
for every offender; rather, there are at least two, often wildly dispar-
ate, possible punishments in plea-bargained cases. And prosecutors
will not offer a plea that does not include, as a condition, that the
defendant waive virtually all adjudicatory rights and agree to a
verdict delivered at a pro forma hearing that is a far cry from the
classic adversarial trial.3 Plea bargaining as practiced today encour-
ages the parties to adopt positions that are antithetical to the most
important goals of the system.
This Article argues that the only way to align plea bargaining
with the substantive and procedural premises of American criminal
justice is to change those premises. It imagines a system in which
1. See infra Part I.B.
2. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/
[https://perma.cc/7XDL-YF5N] (explaining how plea bargaining offers an over-burdened crim-
inal justice system a way out).
3. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
1508 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1505
retribution is no longer the lodestar of criminal punishment, and in
which party control of the process is no longer the desideratum of
adjudication. If, instead, plea bargaining were seen as a mechanism
for implementing a sentencing regime focused primarily on indi-
vidual crime prevention rather than retributionas in the salad
days of indeterminate sentencingand if it were filtered through a
system that is inquisitorial (that is, judicially-monitored) rather
than run by the adversaries, it would have a much greater chance
of evolving into a procedurally coherent mechanism for achieving
substantively accurate results. Plea bargaining would become dispo-
sition bargaining, in which the defendant would agree to participate
in a structured risk management program in exchange for a sus-
pended sentence, a specific sentence length, more time spent in
community alternatives to prison, or certain prison conditions. At
the same time, all defendantsnot just those who refuse to plea
bargainwould go to trial, because an inquisitorial system does not
permit guilty pleas. While such a system would require the
prosecution to prove its case to a judge with respect to both guilt
and punishment, it could still promote efficiency through disposi-
tional bargains that encourage defendants to admit their criminal
conduct and to give up their right to a jury
Implementing this regime would require a reorientation of the
criminal justice system. But, as a substantive matter, this reori-
ented system would not be significantly different from what now
occurs in this country through diversion programs and specialized
fora, such as drugs courts and, as a procedural matter, it would be
very similar to the process found in several European countries.
Part I explains why plea bargaining does not fit well with the
current system, either substantively or procedurally. Part II elabor-
ates how plea bargaining would work in a prevention-oriented,
inquisitorial regime, using examples from both the United States
and Europe. Finally, Part III responds to some of the theoretical and
practical objections to this approach.
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I. PLEA BARGAINING TODAY
As Justice Kennedy stated in Lafler v. Cooper, criminal justice
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.4
Whether excusable or not, that development is understandable. The
huge increase in criminal cases since the 1960s,5 combined with the
expense, in both time and money, of full-blown jury trials, has made
plea bargaining the primary engine of American criminal justice,6
the mechanism for resolving over 95 percent of all criminal cases.7
Unfortunately, that engine pushes the system down a different
track than the one our preeminent substantive and procedural tra-
ditions would seem to dictate.
A. Plea Bargaining and Desert
The substantive goals of the American criminal justice system are
multifold: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
are the usual objectives given. But for the past forty years or so, the
predominant goal has been retribution.8 Deterrence and other forms
of prevention are important, but legislators, either following or lead-
ing the public, have made giving offenders what they deserve their
top punishment priority,9 and many scholars have jumped on the
4. 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
5. In 1960, the FBI reported 2,019,600 index crimes; by 1972, the number was 5,891,900.
FED.BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1972: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
61 tbl.2 (1973).
6. Writing over thirty years ago when trials were simpler than they are now, Albert
Alschuler stated: [T]he American jury trial now has become so complex that our society
usually refuses to provide it. Reluctant to reconsider our expensive trial procedures, we press
most defendants to forgo even the more expeditious form of [bench] trial that defendants once
were freely afforded as a matter of right. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendants Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931,
971-72 (1983).
7. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) ([T]oday, 95 percent of criminal
convictions result from guilty pleas and only 5 percent result from trials. Plea bargaining is
no longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials; it is the norm.) (footnote omitted).
8. See Sara Steen & Rachel Bandy, When the Policy Becomes the Problem: Criminal
Justice in the New Millennium, 9 PUNISHMENT & SOCY 5, 6 (2007).
9. See id. at 5 (Over the past three decades, legislators have created a conversation
[about punishment] in which the inclusion of principles other than retribution and revenge
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retributive bandwagon.10 Some have even argued that blameworthi-
ness, as determined by the general population, should usually be
the only punishment consideration, on the assumption that crime
prevention goals can often be achieved through sentences based on
desert.11
Unfortunately for this point of view, plea bargaining regularly
results in disproportionate punishments.12 Plea bargaining creates
a fundamental problem for retributivism because, for bargaining to
work, there must be a significant divergence between the sentence
that results from a plea and the sentence that results from trial.13
Perhaps the sentence proffered by the bargaining prosecutor is retri-
butively appropriate, perhaps the sentence that can be imposed at
trial is, or perhaps neither is. The important point is that, at best,
only one of these sentences can reflect a defendants true desert.
While most retributivists are willing to contemplate a sentencing
range for a given crime, those sentencing variations are meant to
recognize that different offenders charged with the same crime
might warrant different punishments, not that the same offender
can receive divergent sentences.14
is virtually impossible.); see also Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommenda-
tions for Sentencing Reform, 57 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1079-80 (1992) (discussing determinate
sentencing as an example of the move to retribution as the dominant sentencing goal since
the 1960s).
10. See Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 119-20 (2010) (discus-
sing the retributivist revival among scholars); Michael Tonry, Introduction: Thinking about
Punishment, in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT 3, 6 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2011) (By 1980 .... [m]ost writing on punishment philosophy and theory had a pronounced
retributive slant.).
11. See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between
Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1836 (2007) ([S]trong ar-
guments suggest greater utility in a distribution based on shared intuitions of justice than in
a distribution based upon optimizing deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation.).
12. See H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 73 (2011) (discussing the reasons that plea bargains
lead to disproportionate punishments).
13. See David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential
Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOCY REV. 45, 45 (1981) (It
is this sentence differential (whether conceived of as a reward to guilty pleaders or as a pun-
ishment of those who waste the courts time by needless trials) which has traditionally been
seen as the engine driving the plea-bargaining assembly line.).
14. See Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 319-20 (1996) ([T]he
twenty-five percent spread in the Guidelines sentencing range provides courts with enough
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To facilitate bargaining, some retributivists might be willing to
countenance a small differential between the plea and trial sen-
tence. But in practice that option is rarely available, apparently
because a greater differential is needed to encourage guilty pleas.15
It is well documented that the trial penalty can be three to four
times the plea bargain deal (in Lafler, for instance, the plea offer/
trial differential was more than 350 percent16), and it rarely falls
below a 15 percent increase.17 Even under the federal sentencing
guidelinesa regime that requires prosecutors to adhere to a nar-
row retributive range for a particular crimethe formal discount for
a guilty plea is substantial (25 to 35 percent), and presumably well
beyond what even a flexible retributivist would permit.18
As a result, bargaining practices routinely make a joke out of the
conceit that our system is founded on desert. Take the most famous
case in this regard, Bordenkircher v. Hayes.19 There, the prosecution
told Paul Hayes, charged with his third offense (a forgery), that if
he did not plead guilty and accept a five-year sentence, then he
faced trial under a three-strikes statute that required life in prison
upon conviction; Hayes refused the deal, was convicted, and was
sentenced to life.20 Most would agree that the life sentence was
flexibility to individualize sentences for offenders whose criminal conduct and criminal history
are similar.).
15. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1271 (2008) (concluding from empirical analysis that, [t]o
achieve a sufficiently high guilty-plea rate, the discount might have to be set much higher
than 33%).
16. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012). Lafler was charged with assault
with intent to kill and three other offenses. Id. The prosecutor offered to dismiss two of the
charges and recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months to the judge; when Lafler refused the
deal, he was tried on all counts, convicted, and sentenced to 185 to 360 months. Id.; see also,
Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1199-200 (2015)
(finding that the federal trial penalty averages 64 percent).
17. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 992 (2005) (finding increases in sentences for those who go to trial
ranging from 13% to 461% in Washington, from 58% to 349% in Maryland, and from 23% to
95% in Pennsylvania).
18. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2488-89 (2004). Bibas notes that informal discounts are often far greater, especially in
connection with charge bargaining. Id. at 2536.
19. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
20. See id. at 358-59.
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disproportionate to Hayess crimes; indeed, one can make a plau-
sible argument that even the five-year sentence offered by the
prosecution was disproportionate, especially if the focus is solely on
the forgery. But the important point is not that the legislature may
have ignored retributive ideals in authorizing these sentences. It is
that, rather than pursue the just disposition, whatever it may be,
the institution of plea bargaining requires prosecutors to be willing
to seek two entirely different sentences, at least one of which will be
disproportionate to the defendants culpability. 
Usually, of course, defendants like Hayes take the deal, some-
times because it provides more certainty, but most often because it
is simply too good to turn down. As Federal District Court Judge
Jed Rakoff recently noted, in 2012, the average sentence for feder-
al narcotics defendants who entered into any kind of plea bargain
was five years and four months, while the average sentence for
defendants who went to trial was sixteen years.21 Significant dif-
ferentials also occur in substantial assistance cases. For instance,
Gordon Shuster was a big-time drug manufacturer and dealer,
charged with multiple drug offenses.22 But his cooperation with the
authorities in helping to nab other, lesser players in his drug empire
allowed him to avoid incarceration completely.23
From a purely retributive perspective, the practice of reducing a
sentence or charge in exchange for a guilty plea or information is
unjustifiable. The mere fact that the defendant is willing to plead
guilty has little or no bearing on an offenders desert. Even if one
were to accept the disputed notion that remorse is relevant to des-
ert,24 and the even more questionable assumption that a guilty plea
signals genuine remorse,25 the mitigating impact of the agreement
21. Rakoff, supra note 2.
22. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 197-98 (1995).
23. See Christopher Slobogin, The Story of Rule 410 and United States v. Mezzanatto:
Using Plea Statements at Trial, in EVIDENCE STORIES 103, 124 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006);
see also Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 608 (1999)
(The average difference between cooperation and non-cooperation sentences in narcotics
trafficking cases is more than five years and as the sentences grow, so do the reductions.).
24. See Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157,
168 (1986) (Factors dealing with the present, such as the defendants ... repentance and
desire to make restitution ... are not truly compatible with pure desert sentencing.). 
25. Even the American Bar Association recognizes as much. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE §§ 14-1.8(a)(i), 14-1.8(a)(iii) (AM. BAR ASSN 1980) (noting that a guilty plea may not
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to plead guilty cannot account for such a huge windfall.26 When, as
in Shusters case, the discount results from providing the govern-
ment substantial assistance in solving other crimes or fingering
other criminals, the insult to retributivism is even more flagrant.
Willingness to rat on ones colleagues in crime often has nothing to
do with an individuals culpability for his or her current charge, and,
as in Shusters case, may even be inversely related.27 Yet a signifi-
cant number of plea deals are based on cooperation.28
One might try to salvage the situation, at least outside sub-
stantial assistance cases, by positing that the reduced charges or
sentences that occur in plea bargained cases reflect true desert,
while the initial charge is merely a negotiating ploy.29 But if that
were true, in the 5 percent or so of the cases in which defendants
reject the plea and are convicted, the resulting sentence would, by
definition, be disproportionate. Furthermore, if the prosecutors of-
fer reflects true desert, defendants have a good argument that they
should receive an even better deal. After all, by pleading guilty and
obviating trial they are giving the prosecutor something of value; in
return, they should receive punishment that is more lenient than
indicate true repentance).
26. See Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility
and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (2000) (The practice of differential
sentencing makes far more sense as punishment for anti-social behavior [going to trial] than
it does as either a reward to those willing to forgo a right or as a legitimate penal response
to the defendants character.).
27. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 199, 211-12 (1993) (discussing the cooperation paradox created by sentencing depar-
tures for substantial assistance in cases in which [t]he highly culpable offender may be the
best placed to negotiate a big sentencing break). As Schulhofer notes, Minor players, periph-
erally involved and with little knowledge or responsibility, have little to offer and thus can
wind up with far more severe sentences than the boss. Id. at 212.
28. See Rajan S. Trehan, An Unfortunate Bit of Legal Jargon: Prosecutorial Vouching
Applied to Cooperating Witnesses, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 998 (2014) (In 2012, approxi-
mately twelve percent of all defendants sentenced in the federal system cooperated with the
government, and some likely assisted in multiple matters.). At the same time, defendants
who refuse to cooperate with the prosecution may be punished disproportionately. See Aaron
M. Clemens, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to Prevent Unjust Convictions,
23 QLR 151, 179-80 (2004) (describing cases in which defendants who refused to cooperate
received extra-long sentences because of their arrogant refusal to help prosecute others).
29. See Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading
Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1401-02 (2003) ([T]here is no reason to assume that offenders
who receive plea bargained dispositions are receiving any lower a sentence or charge of
conviction than the system as a whole regards as appropriate for their case.).
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they deserve. In practice, plea bargaining often works in that fash-
ion. A negotiated sentence will be significantly lower than desert
would dictate, or at least lower than what the public thinks offen-
ders deserve,30 simply because efficiency becomes the preeminent
concern (which helps explain the hundreds of thousands of non-
prosecutions on low-level charges).31
However, it should also be recognized that the negotiated sen-
tence or charge could also be much higher than desert dictates (as
might be the case with the five-year sentence offered in Hayes and
many of the drug cases noted by Judge Rakoff).32 As William Stuntz
has argued, prosecutors often push legislators to enact extremely
harsh sentences and easier-to-prove crimes to provide leverage
during bargaining.33 That means that even bargained-for punish-
ment can be well above the optimum desert threshold.
The best attempt to reconcile retributivism with plea bargaining
comes from Michael Cahill.34 Cahill recognizes that under an ab-
solutist retributive model in which every offender must receive his
or her just desert, plea bargaining, witness immunity, downward
departures for substantial assistance, and any other failure to
impose deserved punishment would be categorically banned.35
However, Cahill claims that under what he calls consequentialist
30. See Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discre-
tion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987, 992 (1995) (A large
portion of the public disapproves of plea bargaining because it perceives the process as being
too lenient on defendants.).
31. See Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1589 (2012) (Today,
large percentages of the many millions of arrests occurring annually nationwide for felonies
and misdemeanors alike do not result in prosecution, much less conviction.). 
32. See Caldwell, supra note 12, at 73 ([N]egotiations are fundamentally skewed in ways
that may lead ... to guilty defendants serving sentences disproportionate to their crimes.); see
also Rakoff, supra note 2 (discussing the inordinate power prosecutors have to structure plea
deals).
33. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 260-65 (2011)
(describing how criminal liability rules grew broader, the number of overlapping criminal
offenses mushroomed, and the definition of crimes grew more specific (and thus easier to
prove), in part so that legislators could look tough on crime and in part because broader and
more specific substantive law was a means of inducing guilty pleas); see also United States
v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (To coerce guilty pleas, and sometimes to
coerce cooperation as well, prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, enhanced mandatory
sentences that no onenot even the prosecutors themselvesthinks are appropriate.).
34. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815
(2007).
35. See id. at 854.
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retributivism, prosecutors could forgo punishment (or accept re-
duced punishment) for some offenders, if doing so would enhance
the total measure of desert-based punishment among all offend-
ers.36 For example, prosecutors could reduce sentences below the
proper deserved disposition if that reduction freed up resources for
prosecuting offenders who would otherwise not be prosecuted, or if
it provided evidence (as in substantial assistance cases) that allowed
conviction of an otherwise unconvictable offender.37
Consequential retributivism may make sense on a conceptual
level. To work, however, it requires figuring out how many desert-
units are lost in connection with a particular reduction for a partic-
ular crime. For instance, if the goal is to convict a person charged
with armed robbery who insists on going to trial, a consequential
retributivist needs to determine how much desert can be sacrificed
through bargaining in other cases in an effort to free up the re-
sources necessary to proceed with the prosecution. To get those
resources is it permissible, for example, to extract a guilty plea from
a murderer by reducing his deserved sentence by 50 percent, or from
six burglars by reducing their deserved sentences by 30 percent?
There is no discernible way of answering these questions. If, in-
stead, convicting someone through anothers substantial assistance
is the goal, imponderables again arise. For instance, to convict a
drug kingpin with a lieutenants testimony, how far may prosecutors
reduce the lieutenants just sentence? As Cahill notes, the type of
calculus required by these questions is very difficult.38 Additionally,
we have to assume that prosecutors would recognize and reliably
engage in the type of tradeoffs just described. And, of course, we
must also endorse the significant predicate assumption that there
is agreement on the deserved amount of punishment in the first
place.39
36. Id. at 835.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 867 (The very notion of calculating the value of desert along some metric that
would enable its comparison to other goods, like crime reduction or cost savings, might seem
either odd or patently impossible.).
39. See Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309, 312 (The
fact that retributivism places so much emphasis on proportionality (or fairness) in punish-
ment, but cannot offer much illumination about what proportionality isor how to achieve
itis a key insight that something has gone wrong with retributive theory, even on its own
terms.). 
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More importantly, even if consequential retributivism can be
made to work, it is an outright admission that desert is at best only
an important consideration that can be sacrificed in individual
cases. If real-world practicein which almost all criminal cases are
resolved through punishment reductions that presumptively depart
from desertis any indication, that sacrifice is routine. Further-
more, if consequential retributivism is truly consequential, it justi-
fies prosecutors in pursuing charges like those in Hayes that punish
far too harshly.40 After all, such tactics will scare defendants into
pleading guilty and thus conserve resources for other cases.
B. Plea Bargaining and Due Process
Plea bargaining also makes a mockery of our procedural tradi-
tions. For all practical purposes, prosecutors, not judges or juries,
control the adjudication process.41 And because so many criminal
cases are resolved through plea, very few defendants ever exercise
their rights to remain silent, testify, confront accusers, or be heard
by a jury during a public trial. Rather, these rights are merely bar-
gaining chips to be used in negotiations with the prosecutor, and are
relinquished on a routine basis.42
Less well-recognized is the fact that, at an alarmingly increasing
rate, prosecutors are requiring defendants who want to benefit from
a plea to waive rights that are not intrinsically forfeited through a
plea.43 For instance, plea agreements often include waivers of the
40. See Cahill, supra note 34, at 855 ([A] sacrifice of desert is allowed in one case if it
enables a more-than-offsetting gain in another case.).
41. See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea Bargainings Innocence Problem and
the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 61 ([A] general consensus has evolved within
plea bargaining scholarship that plea bargaining became a dominant force as a result of
prosecutors gaining increasing power and control in an ever more complex criminal justice
system.).
42. See Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1181,
1237 (1996) ([I]n a criminal justice system in which plea bargaining is the dominant mode
of adjudication, the chief significance of a much-vaunted constitutional right may lie in its
value as a bargaining chip.).
43. Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Consti-
tutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 76 (2015) (As we transformed from an adversary
process where guilt was determined by trial to an administrative process where guilt and
penalties are determined by negotiation, many prosecutors began demanding waiver of all
constitutional criminal procedure rights, not just the trial and investigative-related ones
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Brady right (the right to exculpatory evidence), the right to
effective assistance of counsel, and the right to appeal.44 Prosecutors
have also been known to use waivers as a way of avoiding con-
stitutional claims that can establish unfavorable precedent.45 And
because prosecutors can make pleas so attractive, defense attorneys
often give up these constitutional claims; to insist on bringing them
might even be unethical, given defense counsels obligation to get
the best possible deal for their clients.46
Remarkably, all of this appears to be constitutional. In Mez-
zanatto v. United States, the Supreme Court permitted waiver of
the protection in the Federal Rules of Evidence against trial use of
statements made during plea bargaining.47 In the course of doing so
it stated, [t]he plea bargaining process necessarily exerts pressure
on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of funda-
mental rights, but we have repeatedly held that the government
may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in
return for the plea.48
As this statement from Mezzanatto suggests, plea waivers
waivers that ensure that constitutional rights are not exercised in
over 90 percent of criminal casesare entirely consistent with
inherent in replacing the trial with the plea.).
44. See id. at 85, 87 (documenting that, of the federal plea agreements studied, roughly
25 percent waived discovery rights and 35 percent waived ineffective counsel claims); Pre-
liminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, 33 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 363, 386-88 n.1338
(2004) (listing cases holding that pleading defendants may waive right to appeal). But see
Bloomberg BNA, Plea Bargains: Justice Tells Prosecutors to Stop Requiring Ineffectiveness
Waivers as Part of Plea Deals, 96 CRIM. L. REP. 115 (2014) (reporting new Justice Department
policy stating that prosecutors should no longer demand waivers of Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance challenges).
45. Pamela Metzger, The Case for a Collective Gideon (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at
5) (on file with author) (asserting that prosecutors make plea bargains to avoid the litigation
of meritorious claims when they are unwilling to risk establishing a precedent that would
damage the governments institutional interests).
46. Id. (Defense attorneys must abandon meritorious claims with institutional impact
when they are offered a plea bargain that advance[s] their clients individual interests.).
47. See 513 U.S. 196 (1995); see also FED. R. EVID. 410 (prohibiting use at trial of
statements made during plea bargaining).
48. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 209-10 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219
(1978)); see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (The most basic rights of
criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver.). Mezzanatto intimated that rights or
evidentiary protections that are crucial to the reliability of the factfinding process might not
be waivable. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204-05. Whether the Court would apply that
exception to claims that are not plea intrinsic is not clear.
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adversarialism as it is practiced in the United States. That is be-
cause the key tenet of American adversarialism is that the parties,
not the courts, are in charge of producing the information necessary
for adjudication.49 Although this party-driven process is nowhere
required in the Constitution,50 it has become so firmly ensconced in
the American criminal justice system that defendants are even
allowed to plead guilty while maintaining their innocenceso-called
Alford pleas.51 Where the parties control the adjudicatory input,
waivers that truncate or eliminate the trial process are not only
justified, they become an entitlement, regardless of the validity of
the states or the defendants case.52
As a result, the findings of fact that emerge from plea bargaining
are not subject to any meaningful testing. While the arraignment
judge must find a factual basis for the plea, this requirement can be
satisfied merely by asking the parties in charge of evidence produc-
tionthe prosecutor and the defense attorneyif such a basis
exists.53 And not even that much is required for the facts underlying
the sentence.54 De facto, criminal verdicts and sentences are simply
49. The Honorable Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family
Court Judges Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POLY 57, 64-65 (2005) ([T]he adversarial
process grants the parties control over the process[,] and the decision-maker, whether a judge
or a jury, controls over the decision.).
50. See Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1225, 1257-68 (2016) (explaining how the Supreme Courts recent decisions granting
prosecutors complete charging discretion run counter to both constitutional language and
traditional English practice).
51. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (An individual accused of crime
may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sen-
tence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the
crime.).
52. See Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation,
47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 180 (1999) ([I]t is almost as if the Constitution is not the supreme law
of the land, but merely an expensive option-package that a defendant can purchase if he does
not want the models available on the lot for a discount.).
53. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 140 (2004) (noting that at guilty plea hearings,
defendants provide very brief factual statements explaining what they did, which are often
written by their lawyers); Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1415, 1417-18 (2016) ([P]lea bargains are not confessionsthey do not
even typically involve detailed admissions of guilt. The defendant generally admits to acts
satisfying the elements of the crimea legally sufficient admission to be surebut often not
under oath and typically without support from an extensive factual record.).
54. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38, 43 (1995) (holding that since Rule 11s
factual basis requirement applies only to plea[s] of guilty, courts must ascertain only the
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arrangements between the parties, with the court and the court-
room process playing a minor role.
Perhaps none of this would be cause for concern if it produced
reliable results. But, as already discussed, plea bargaining often
results in inaccurate punishment of the guilty, at least when mea-
sured on the retributive metric.55 Of at least equivalent concern is
the fact, confirmed through both field and laboratory research, that
the combination of uncertain trial outcomes and enticing plea offers
leads innocent people to plead guilty.56 When clearly innocent people
are found guilty because the prosecutor is able to offer them a Hob-
sons choice, both the procedural and substantive tenets of criminal
justice are victims.57
II. PLEA BARGAINING REIMAGINED
The system is willing to put up with these flagrant assaults on
its substantive and procedural underpinnings because efficiency
has become king.58 Without plea bargaining the system would
likely collapse.59 Yet plea bargaining cannot work without desert-
facts underlying the criminal offense, not those relating to punishment, and at most need only
obtain a stipulation of facts supporting a recommendation). 
55. See supra Part I.A.
56. See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendants Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargainings Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 34, 36 (2013) (detailing a laboratory study finding that over 50 percent of the
innocent subjects pleaded guilty and accepted minimal punishment to avoid more aversive
treatment); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012)
([I]nnocent misdemeanants routinely plead guilty to get out of jail because they cannot afford
bail.); D. Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen
and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 996 (2010) (estimating an absolute floor of 4.5 per-
cent wrongful convictions resulting from guilty pleas in serious felony cases).
57. It has been argued that false pleas are preferable to trials that may not result in
acquittals, especially for misdemeanants who are recidivists. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the
Innocent, 156 U. PA.L.REV. 1117, 1120-22 (2008). But this reasoning cannot justify false pleas
for those charged with serious offenses. In any event, false pleas offend retributive justice and
result in a bizarre regime that, as Bowers puts it, asks us to reconceive of false pleas as legal
fictions and to require defense lawyers to advise and assist innocent defendants who wish to
mouth dishonest on-the-record words of guilt. Id. at 1121.
58. See Mirjan Damaska, What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 329, 340 (2008) (concluding that the only viable justification for plea bargaining
is efficiency).
59. See Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye
and Lafler v. Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (2013) (discussing how plea bargaining
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distorting discounts between bargained-for sentences and trial
sentences and without some mechanism for truncating adjudica-
tion, which under the current system means guilty pleas and the
attendant waivers of trial and appellate rights. Plea bargainings
insult to retributivism and to our most treasured constitutional
rights is inevitable in a high-prosecution, adversary-driven system
like ours.
But the criminal justice system does not have to be focused on
retributivism as the linchpin of punishment or on adversary-
controlled adjudication as the method of resolving disputes. In other
work, I have argued that a system bottomed on preventive justice,
similar to that originally contemplated by indeterminate sentencing
policies, is preferable to a punishment regime based primarily on
desert.60 In a preventive justice regime, the emphasis at sentencing
would be on the individual prevention goals of rehabilitation,
specific deterrence, and incapacitation. Desert would still play the
dominant role in crime definition, but its role at sentencing would
be minimal, primarily focused on fixing sentencing maxima.61
General deterrence would not be an explicit goal but rather a by-
product of the preventive dispositions imposed. The focal point of
adjudication, once it is established that an individual has committed
a crime, would be the individuals risk and ways of managing that
risk, ideally aided by actuarial or structured evaluation tech-
niquesoften referred to as risk-needs assessment.62
In another work, I have also argued for the adoption of an in-
quisitorial procedure that relies primarily on judicial rather than
party-control of the adjudication process.63 In that type of system,
is a system that is tolerated because, without it, our criminal justice system would be so
overwhelmed that it would collapse).
60. Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The Modern Case
for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011).
61. Christopher Slobogin, Empirical Desert and Preventive Justice: A Comment, 17 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 376, 379 (2014) (outlining the role retribution would play in a preventive justice
system).
62. For a relatively recent description of risk-needs assessment by its progenitors, see
generally JAMES BONTA & D.A. ANDREWS, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL FOR OFFENDER
ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION (2007), http://www.pbpp.pa.gov/Information/Documents/
Research/EBP7.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDD9-LAH8].
63. Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 699
(2014).
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guilty pleasbut not plea bargainingwould be abolished. At the
resulting trials, the parties would still be allowed to produce and
question witnesses, and juries would still be the default decision
maker. But judges would have the power to call their own witnesses,
subpoena other evidence, and question all who appear to testify. As
occurs in Europe, the judge would both begin the questioning and
have the authority to ask questions following those from the
attorneys.64
While both of these proposals are controversial, both are feasible
and can be implemented without violating the Constitution. Part
III briefly rehearses support for these two claims. But first, here in
Part II, I imagine what plea bargaining would look like in a pre-
ventively-oriented, hybrid-inquisitorial regime. At first glance, plea
bargaining appears to be a very poor fit with a regime that autho-
rizes sentences that the parties cannot predict and a procedure that
does away with guilty pleas. But, in fact, past and current practices
in this country suggest plea bargaining and preventive justice can
work well together. And practice in Europe, particularly in Ger-
many, suggests that plea bargaining and inquisitorial procedures
can have a symbiotic relationship as well.
A. Plea Bargaining and Preventive Justice
A sentencing regime focused on preventive justice could, on the
books, look much like the sentencing provisions of the original
Model Penal Code (MPC), promulgated by the American Law Insti-
tute (ALI) in 1960.65 Unlike the narrow, retributively-defined
sentence ranges called for under the recently revised MPC sen-
tencing provisions,66 the original MPC scheme established wide
sentencing ranges for felonies that all began at one year and in-
creased in breadth according to crime severity, with the caveat that
even one-year sentences could be reduced in light of the crime and
the history and character of the defendant.67 The sentence range for
64. See id. at 716.
65. See MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
66. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.09 (2012).
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.12 (1962) (allowing reductions if sentence is unduly harsh
in light of the nature and circumstances of the crime and ... the history and character of the
defendant).
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first-degree felonies was one to twenty years; for second-degree
felonies, one to ten years; and third-degree felonies, one to five
years.68 Although the judge imposed the sentence, the parole board
determined its ultimate length, on the theory that individual pre-
vention should be the primary goal of sentencing.69 As Herbert
Wechsler wrote in his 1961 defense of this system:
Even when aided by a competent presentence study and report,
the court is poorly equipped at the time of sentence to make solid
and decisive judgments on the period required for the process of
correction to realize its optimum potentiality or for the risk of
further criminality to reach a level where release of the offender
appears reasonably safe. The organs of correction, on the other
hand, are best equipped to make decisions of this order and to
make them later on in time, in light of observation and experi-
ence within the institution.70
This type of regime was quite popular in the United States in the
decades prior to the original MPCs enactment.71 Enthusiasm for it
has since withered, in part because of distrust of parole boards and
concerns about the efficacy of rehabilitationmatters that are ad-
dressed further in Part III. But perhaps the most importantand
certainly the most neglectedexplanation of why indeterminate
sentencing in its pure form did not find a solid foothold in this
country is that it makes plea bargaining very difficult. If the length
and nature of sentences are determined by back-end decision
makers, then prosecutors have little of substance to offer defendants
prior to trial, making plea bargaining hard to sustain.
68. Id. § 6.06.
69. See id. § 6.10 (authorizing release by parole board before end of maximum sentence);
id. § 305.9 (providing that prisoners shall be released as soon as they become eligible for
parole, unless analysis of their risk, their need for in-prison treatment, or the effect of release
or respect for the law and institutional discipline dictates otherwise).
70. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 465, 476 (1961).
71. See Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences,
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POLY 151, 157 (2014) (As the rehabilitative ideal grew in prominence
throughout the 1900s, trial judges in federal and state systems were afforded nearly unfet-
tered discretion to impose upon criminal defendants just about any prison term selected from
within wide statutory ranges, and parole officials exercised similar discretion concerning
actual release dates.) (footnote omitted).
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In his mammoth study on plea bargaining in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, George Fisher documented this dynamic.72
Based on his examination of practice in Massachusetts, California,
Illinois, and New York, Fisher concluded that [t]he demise of the
indeterminate sentence, one of the most promising of the late nine-
teenth centurys progressive brainchildren, bears the mark of plea
bargainings malice.73 Because indeterminate sentencing robs both
prosecutors and judges of the power to control sentence lengths, it
would have hobbled the plea-bargaining regime, and thus was re-
sisted by both groups.74
However, Fishers study also reveals that some forms of this
resistance, in effect, allowed indeterminate sentences to co-exist
with plea bargaining. For instance, in states where indeterminate
sentence provisions applied only if the defendant went to state pris-
on, prosecutors and defendants agreed to non-prison dispositions,
either in less secure institutions or under probationary conditions.75
Prosecutors also prevailed upon parole authorities to release plead-
ing defendants when the minimum sentence expired if they met
certain conditions, such as behaving in prison or successfully com-
pleting treatment.76
These adjustments to the system signal a way in which plea bar-
gaining could work within an indeterminate sentencing regime. In
those cases involving very high risk offenders, the prosecutor might
not be willing to bargain at all. In other cases, however, the pros-
ecutor might offer the defendant probation, a partially suspended
sentence, a minimum security setting, or the minimum prison term,
contingent upon the defendant admitting criminal conduct, waiving
the right to jury, and completing a designated risk management pro-
gram. Risk management programs might include substance abuse
72. See George Fisher, Plea Bargainings Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (2000).
73. Id. at 860.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1047-49, 1055-56 (describing Fishers study of nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century practice in Massachusettss indeterminate sentencing regime, in which the
percentage of state prison sentences decreased as a result of plea bargaining, and a study in
California in the early 1970s, during the heyday of indeterminate sentencing in that state,
which indicated that [t]he most important axis along which plea bargaining took place
became the distinction between a state-prison term and no state-prison term).
76. See id. at 1054, 1057 (describing practice in Illinois and California in which some
judges and prosecutors appealed to parole authorities to stand by promises made in the course
of plea negotiations that the defendant would walk free on a certain date).
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treatment, vocational training, anger management, and a host of
other rehabilitation efforts, either within or outside of prison.77 If
the defendant accepted the offer, and the judge signed off on the
agreement (a particularly important aspect of the inquisitorial
regime described in more detail below), then the parole board would
be bound by the arrangement. If the program was not completed
successfully, then the terms of the agreement would establish the
consequence: jail time, revocation of probation and imprisonment,
more onerous prison conditions, or extension of the prison sentence,
with ultimate control of the sentence once again in the hands of the
parole board.
Fishers research indicates that this type of agreement can work
because prosecutors are able to make a concrete promise, up-front,
despite a sentencing structure featuring a back-end decision maker.
Modern practice confirms that observation. The agreements reached
in a preventive justice regime would probably not be that different
from those obtained today in the run-of-the-mill misdemeanor or
lower level felony case.78 They would be even closer in form to those
that occur on a routine basis in todays drug courts, where either
sentencing or prosecution is suspended if the defendant agrees to
undergo substance abuse treatment and successfully completes it.79
77. For specific risk management programs, see generally WHAT ELSE WORKS?: CREATIVE
WORK WITH OFFENDERS (Jo Brayford et al. eds., 2010); James McGuire, What Works in
Correctional Intervention? Evidence and Practical Implications, in OFFENDERREHABILITATION
IN PRACTICE: IMPLEMENTING AND EVALUATING EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS 25 (Gary A. Bernfeld et
al. eds., 2001). In general, programs that are therapeutic rather than punitive, aim at high-
risk offenders, and take place in the community are the most effective at reducing risk. See
Brandon C. Welsh et al., Promoting Change, Changing Lives: Effective Prevention and Inter-
vention to Reduce Serious Offending, in FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME:
CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION 245 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington
eds., 2012).
78. Michael M. OHear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 464
(2008) (In misdemeanor and other low-level cases, the defendant is apt to receive a sentence
of straight probation or a relatively brief period of closer supervision.).
79. See RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 3 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_drugcourts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S35H-PAXX] (describing one model of drug court as deferred prosecution
or diversionwhere successful completion of the program avoids prosecutionand a second
model as post-adjudicationwhere defendants plead guilty but avoid sentence and perhaps
have their conviction expunged if they successfully complete the program). The regime
envisioned here is closer to the post-adjudication model, although the plea of guilty would be
replaced by a trial. See infra Part II.B.
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Although this plea-bargaining regime thus has analogues in cur-
rent practice, it also differs from todays bargaining system in at
least two significant ways. First, plea bargaining in a preventive
regime can be more easily justified as a theoretical matter. While
any divergence between a bargained disposition and a post-trial
disposition automatically tramples on the retributive ideal, such a
difference is not innately inconsistent with the avowed purpose of
punishment in a preventive regime, because individual prevention
can plausibly be pursued in so many ways. Specific deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation can be accomplished through
imprisonment, alternatives to prison, and various types of rehabili-
tation programs in and outside of prison walls, over varying periods
of time and, depending upon the offender, with varying degrees of
success.80 Consider again, for instance, the case of Paul Hayes, who
before his forgery charges had been convicted of both robbery and
detaining a female (a lesser form of rape). One appropriate preven-
tive disposition in a case like his might be the maximum term
(presumptively five years under the old MPC, subject to reduction
by the parole board) because his recidivism suggests he was at a
relatively high risk to reoffend. But, depending on the results of a
risk-needs assessment, a prosecutor might also be willing to offer
someone like Hayes a shorter prison term, in combination with
restitution to the victim of the forgery and participation in an
academic or vocational training program.81
In short, a significant divergence between a disposition offered
during bargaining and the disposition that results when there is no
bargain does not offend the preventive goal as easily as the retribu-
tive one. The difficulty of ascertaining risk and the fact that it is
contingent on numerous factors, often seen as bugs of a preventive
system, are actually useful features. They allow for experimentation
by the parties and flexibility in disposition.82
80. While I have argued that disposition in a preventive regime is subject to a least drastic
means analysis and thus generally may not be any more restrictive than is necessary to
achieve the governments preventive aim, Slobogin, supra note 60, at 1138, this principle is
not violated if the defendant refuses a less drastic form of intervention.
81. On the effectiveness of such programs, see generally Doris Layton MacKenzie, The
Effectiveness of Corrections-Based Work and Academic and Vocational Education Programs,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 492, 512 (Joan Petersilia &
Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012).
82. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and the Emergent
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A second feature of a preventive regime that is obviously different
from current practice in many jurisdictions is that bargaining takes
place in the shadow of an indeterminate sentencing system in which
defendants who do not bargain have their ultimate disposition de-
termined by a parole board. In such a regime, many defendants will
be most interested in trading for dispositional certainty and a
particular dispositional environment, and only secondarily for a re-
duction in sentence length. Indeed, the duration of an offenders
sentence might be roughly the same regardless of whether a bargain
occurs;83 in both bargained and non-bargained cases, a risk assess-
mentby the prosecutor and the parole board, respectivelywill
play the predominant role.
Because of this possible durational similarity between a bar-
gained and parole board sentence, plea bargaining in a preventive
justice regime would be less one-sided. The prosecutor would not be
able to threaten draconian post-trial determinate sentences of the
type involved in Hayes and in Judge Rakoff s drug cases because
there would be no such sentences. At most, the prosecutor would
only be able to suggest that a failure to accept an offer will expose
the defendant to a particular maximum sentence, the full imposition
of which will depend on an uncertain parole process.
Under these circumstances, innocent people will be less likely to
plead guilty and guilty people will be less likely to accept unduly
harsh offers. Further, given the prosecutions relatively reduced
leverage, negotiations are likely to be more meaningful than the
take-it-or-leave-it phenomenon that characterizes pretrial bargain-
ing today. Of course, such a system would probably also produce
fewer plea agreements overall. But if Fishers findings are correct
about how plea bargaining worked 100 years ago, deals will still be
common.84 While some defendants will be willing to gamble on the
parole board, others who are risk averse will want the certainty of
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 840 (2000) (describing the advantages of
an experimentalist architecture of adjudication that changes in response to interactions
between government and monitored individuals).
83. According to Fisher, the usual practice under indeterminate sentencing regimes in the
early twentieth century was to release prisoners at the completion of the minimum term. See
Fisher, supra note 72, at 1050.
84. See id. at 1053, 1056-57 (summarizing reasons why plea bargaining and indeterminate
sentences co-existed).
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the plea agreement rather than the uncertainty of the indetermi-
nate sentence, especially if less of the sentence is spent in prison.85
Substantial assistance situations like Shusters should also be
handled differently in a preventive regime, although whether they
would be would depend on judicial willingness to curb prosecutorial
enthusiasm for deals in such cases. As it does today, bargaining in
a preventive regime might sometimes revolve around the extent to
which the defendant gives up co-conspirators. But unlike consequen-
tial retributivism, a preventive justice regime that is functioning as
it should would not rely on manipulation of criminal defendants to
achieve results in other cases. Rather, in such a regime substantial
assistance reductions would occur only to the extent that the pro-
vision of information about accomplices decreased the defendants
threat to society, by helping to eradicate the group criminality that
contributed to his or her own criminal conduct. The most incorrigi-
ble defendants (like Shuster?86) would not have significant bargain-
ing power, while bit players in the criminal enterprise would have
more leverage, a result that is a good thing from both a public safety
and a retributive perspective. The obvious obstacle to this outcome
is that prosecutorial need for informationsomething drug kingpins
are more likely to have than their underlingsmight subvert these
objectives.87 If so, it would be up to the judge to prevent skewed
deals, which is more likely in the inquisitorial process described
below, in which judges are charged with carrying out a meaningful
assessment of plea agreements.
In sum, plea bargaining can work in a preventive justice regime,
even though a back-end decision maker determines the default
sentence relying on future-oriented factors relevant to specific deter-
rence, rehabilitation, and incapacitative objectives. Bargaining in
85. Further, a reduction in the amount of plea bargaining could enhance efficiency. Darryl
K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 186
(2014) (Plea bargaining ... can perversely increase demand for criminal prosecutions because
it facilitates them) (emphasis omitted).
86. See Slobogin, supra note 23, at 124 n.36 (noting that, while he served no prison time
after the deal described earlier, see supra text accompanying note 23, Shuster was arrested
again for manufacture of methamphetamine and received a seventeen-year sentence).
87. But see Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial
Revolt on Substantial Assistance Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline,
29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 48-50 (1999) (disputing the existence of the cooperation paradox, the
aforementioned phenomenon of offering those who commit the most serious crimes significant
reductions in sentence for substantial assistance).
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the shadow of indeterminacy can induce defendants to admit guilt
and waive their right to a jury trial, because it makes attractive
those offers that promise a certain or relatively unrestrictive dis-
position. And in contrast to the impossibility of simultaneously
satisfying both the theory-based demands of retributivism and the
practical requirements of plea bargaining, dispositions in a preven-
tive regimewhether or not the result of a bargaincan be
consistent with the substantive goals of the system. To ensure those
goals are met, the pure adversarialism of the current system might
be modified as well.
B. Plea Bargaining and Inquisitorialism
Plea bargaining designed to produce a guilty plea is both a
natural outgrowth of and deeply inimical to adversarial rights. As
described earlier, plea bargaining and guilty pleas are consistent
with the adversarial tenet that the parties control evidence pro-
duction. But their end result is the waiver of trial rights and,
increasingly, rights-waivers that are not intrinsic to a guilty plea.
At first glance, plea bargaining might seem inconsistent with
inquisitorialism as well. After all, plea bargaining can, in effect,
moot the case before it gets to the judge, who is supposed to control
the inquiry in an inquisitorial regime. But a more accurate state-
ment about inquisitorialisms interaction with plea bargaining is
that it bans guilty pleas.88 Inquisitorialism does not prohibit plea
bargaining, but rather the American practice of giving dispositive
effect to whatever the parties decide about guilt and disposition, in
agreements reached in the backrooms of police stations or in pros-
ecutors offices rather than in open court.89
Consider, for instance, the law regulating bargaining in Germany
(admittedly, not always followed in practice90). Under the relevant
88. Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INTL L.J.
1, 11 (2004) (The inquisitorial procedural structure ... does not include the concept of the
guilty plea; it only includes the concept of confession.). 
89. Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53
AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 843 (2005) (noting how, in an inquisitorial system, [i]f an admission of
guilt happens during the pre-trial phase, the case still must go to trial before the judge can
make a final determination).
90. For caveats to the description that follows, see infra notes 91, 94, 96.
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statute, as construed by Germanys Constitutional Court, nego-
tiations between the prosecution and the defense are permitted
and even encouraged, but all negotiations must be on the record.91
Further, whatever the result of the negotiation, both guilt and dis-
position are ultimately to be determined by the court after trial.92
According to the Constitutional Court, the statute unequivocally
rejects the idea that the verdict in a criminal case can be legitimized
by the mere consensus of the participants rather than through an
independent investigation into the facts of the case.93 No case may
be truncated through a guilty plea, nor may it be based on the type
of barebones factual basis inquiry that is routinely accepted as
sufficient in American courts; [e]ven a detailed confession delivered
in open court does not necessarily suffice.94 The notion that a per-
son can plead guilty while maintaining innocence, which makes
sense in a system like ours that allows the parties to control
disposition, is incomprehensible to German judges.95 Also of note,
bargains are not supposed to include waivers of the right to ap-
peal.96 In a truly inquisitorial regime based on judicial discovery of
91. See Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated
Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 91, 104 (2014) (describing subsection
(2) of section 257c of the German Code of Criminal Procedure and indicating that the German
Constitutional Court has required that the content and outcome of any negotiations be placed
on the record). The authors also note, however, that practice in Germany often departs from
the requirements that negotiations be recorded and that the judge independently assess the
evidence. See id. at 92-93.
92. See id. at 84.
93. Id. at 97; see also Erik Luna, Prosecutor King, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POLY 48, 75 (2014)
(German prosecutors must wait until the main proceeding in the district court to formalize
the defendants admission of guilt, and any deal must reflect the state of the evidence col-
lected in the case.).
94. Weigend & Turner, supra note 91, at 97. However, the practice in non-felony cases is
much closer to the party-controlled American practice. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Penal
Order: Prosecutorial Sentencing as a Model for Criminal Justice Reform?, in THE PROSECUTOR
IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 156, 157-58 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
95. See Weigend & Turner, supra note 91, at 103.
96. Id. at 104 (noting that the German Court emphasized ... that appeals waivers not be
made part of a negotiated judgment). Such waivers can still occur, but only after the court
has approved the agreement, informs the defendant that any waiver of appeal is non-binding,
and obtains from the defendant an affirmative statement that appeal is still waived. REGINA
RAUXLOH, PLEA BARGAINING IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-03 (2012) (describ-
ing new legislation establishing this requirement but also noting doubt as to whether judges
and lawyers will adhere to it).
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the truth, waivers of rights that are not plea intrinsic make no
sense.
So constructed, an inquisitorial procedure should enhance reli-
ability in at least two ways. First, it would more likely produce a
vigorous inquiry into the facts relevant both to guilt and sentence.
The hybrid-inquisitorial procedure proposed here is, ironically, more
likely than current American practice to ensure that adversarial
rights such as the right to confront witnesses are exercised in bar-
gained cases. The prosecution would always have to present its case
in court, and the defense would always have the opportunity to
challenge it there. Even if the defendant has admitted guilt and the
parties have agreed to a disposition based on a set version of the
facts, the court has authority to conduct its own inquiry.97 Because
of this judicial oversight, the inquisitorial procedure is more likely
than American practice to produce well-honed punishments.98 It is
also more likely to expose whether improper agendasfor instance,
excessively harsh bargains based on misinformation from the prose-
cution or inappropriate leniency based on substantial assistance
from serious offendersare driving any bargains that are reached.99
The second reliability-enhancing aspect of inquisitorialism as it
applies to plea bargaining is its stance toward waivers. Waivers of
the right to remain silent and of the right to a jury would be
permitted given their tangential connection to fact-finding. But in-
quisitorial judges frown upon waivers of rights that protect against
unreliable verdicts.100 Thus, challenges alleging the discovery of
97. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 229 (2006) (noting the rarity of fact bargaining
in Germany, given the parties knowledge of the judges oversight).
98. Id. at 200 (arguing that judicial involvement in bargaining can render the final
disposition more accurate). 
99. Cf. Bibas, supra note 18, at 2475-76 (In plea bargaining .... [t]he paucity of hard legal
rules ... leaves more room for favoritism, favor-seeking, and connections to operate.... [P]rose-
cutors who are tempted to cut corners find it easier to avoid pursuing every lead and pressing
every advantage during plea bargaining. At public trials, in contrast, concern for reputation
and for avoiding acquittals checks prosecutors desires to minimize effort.) (footnotes
omitted); Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1495, 1549 (2006) (arguing for giving pleading defendants a right to a bench
trial to divest the prosecution of its power to force defendants into harsh and inefficient plea
bargains).
100. See supra note 96; see also Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining and Disclosure in
Germany and the United States: Comparative Lessons, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1554-55
(2016) (German courts and legislators have continually and unequivocally affirmed the
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exculpatory evidence, deficient counsel, or biased or scientifically
invalid risk assessments could not be foreclosed by a bargain. This
perception of certain rights as public rather than personal is
much more consistent with the way American judges viewed process
rights prior to the rise of plea bargaining.101
The discussion to this point has admittedly ignored one key differ-
ence between the hybrid-inquisitorialism practiced in Europe and
how it would play out in the United States. Prosecutors in Germany
are supposed to charge the highest offense the evidence supports
and stick to that charge even during bargaining (although, again,
they do not always do so in fact).102 In contrast, given the United
States Supreme Courts interpretation of separation of powers doc-
trine, prosecutors in this country are the ultimate arbiters of the
charging process, and thus can dismiss, reduce, or enhance charges
virtually at will.103 This ability to manipulate the charge, and
thereby influence the sentence, undermines judicial ability to con-
trol the ultimate outcome.
However, in a preventive justice system of the type proposed
here, judges would still wield substantial power. Not only would
the judge have the authority to demand evidence supporting any
pretrial deal and the authority to dismiss weakly supported or dup-
licative charges, the court would also have broad discretion to
fashion the ultimate sentence in those cases in which the prosecutor
dismisses charges that are warranted by the defendants behavior.
For instance, in a regime modeled on the original MPCs sentencing
provisions,104 if the prosecutor seeking an agreement offered to re-
duce a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony (and thus reduce
the maximum penalty from twenty to ten years), an American judge
defendants right to inspect the evidence early in the pretrial process, and the scope of this
right has expanded over time.... The idea of bargaining away the right to discovery ... would
be incomprehensible to German courts and practitioners.).
101. Indeed, for nineteenth-century judges, waiver of constitutional rights simply was not
permissible, with or without consideration. King, supra note 52, at 120.
102. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Prosecutors and Bargaining in Weak Cases: A Comparative
View, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 94, at 102, 106-10.
103. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ([S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.). For a critique of this position, see Brown, supra
note 50.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
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could not reinstate the first-degree charge, given the prosecutors
control over charging. But the judge would have control over the
sentence within the ten-year maximum, and thus could reject any
disposition the parties agreed upon. Aware of this power, bargaining
attorneys would be less likely to offer (in the case of prosecutors) or
accept (in the case of defense attorneys) lopsided deals. The judges
ability to jettison dispositions within the wide ranges associated
with preventive justice would counteract, if not nullify, the prosecu-
tors ability to control the charge. As Professor Turner has noted
with respect to the typical practice in Germany, given judges vast
sentencing discretion in that country, the dismissal of collateral
charges does not have a significant influence on the ultimate
sentence.105
Of course, an inquisitorial process is more cumbersome because
it requires a trial in every case and would also permit more appeals
asserting rights that go to reliability issues. But, as a number of
scholars have argued well before me,106 this trial orientation does
not have to lead to a collapse of the system. Bargained cases of the
type described in this Article would still often avoid the major ex-
pense of the American systemthe jury trial (and the attendant
inefficiency of jury-centric rules of evidence)and would be trig-
gered by the defendants willingness to admit wrongdoing.107
Moreover, if the inquisitorial process is combined with a pre-
ventive justice regime, proceedings should be even more stream-
lined. In bargained cases, many trials would resemble sentencing
hearings, which should be lean affairs if a competent risk-needs
105. Turner, supra note 97, at 228.
106. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1048 ([T]he proposed system of jury waiver bargaining
... would permit trial judges to discourage the use of an extraordinarily expensive trial
mechanism in cases presenting only insubstantial issues, and it would provide a safety valve
that would enable these judges, within limits established by law, to match resources to
caseloads.); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2005
(1992) ([W]ith reliance on a system of adversarial trials before a judge sitting without a jury,
such a reform would require an increase of only about 20% in the judicial resources devoted
to the adjudication stage; stated as a percentage of total judicial resources, the required
increase would be even smaller.). 
107. A number of studies have shown that bench trials, while longer than guilty plea
hearings, are substantially shorter than jury trials. See Comment, Constitutional Alternatives
to Plea Bargaining: A New Waive, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 349-51 (1984) (describing studies
in Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Detroit, and Philadelphia and concluding, in sum, that bench trials
lasted about twice as long as plea hearings but only one-tenth as long as a jury trial).
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assessment has been carried out; in such cases, the judges primary
job is to double-check the bargain. When there is no bargain, the
judges job will be even easier; if conviction occurs, he or she need
merely assign the appropriate sentencing range because the parole
board will ultimately decide the sentence.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, prosecutors who know
every case will go to trial are less likely to pursue prosecutions of
dubious or easily diverted cases. Given the systems documented
tendencies toward overcriminalization and overcharging,108 fewer
prosecutions would not only result in greater efficiency but might be
welcome for independent reasons as well. In any event, the impor-
tant point for present purposes is that an inquisitorial regime is not
likely to lead to collapse of the adjudication process.
III. OBJECTIONS
This Article has already tried to rebut concerns about how pre-
ventive justice and inquisitorial practices would interact with plea
bargaining. But it does not address more fundamental worries about
whether these substantive and procedural goals are worth pursuing
or are possible to implement. Opponents of preventive justice argue
that it relies on flawed, possibly unconstitutional, risk assessment
techniques and on an overly optimistic view of rehabilitation pro-
grams;109 additionally, they contend that it is highly vulnerable to
disparity in punishment and the whims of parole board members,110
108. See Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 703 (2014) (noting the
difficulty of determining when overcharging occurs but finding, based on a study of eight
years of charging practices by federal prosecutors, patterns of charging and conviction ... that
raise yellow, if not red, flags regarding systemic overcharging); Erik Luna, The Overcrim-
inalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704, 717 (2005) (noting that the United
States has experienced a dramatic enlargement in governmental authority and the breadth
of law enforcement prerogatives and describing this overcriminalization phenomenon as
the result of: (1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that overextend
culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punish-
ments; and (6) excessive or pretextual enforcement of petty violations).
109. See FRANCIS A.ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:PENALPOLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE 72-73 (1981) (arguing that rehabilitation programs seldom work and tend
to be very costly).
110. Id. at 42-43, 49, 57 (arguing that the indeterminate regime needed to implement
rehabilitation programs leads to unequal treatment, demoralized offenders, and cynicism
about the system).
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and, of course, point out that it is inimical to retributive punish-
ment.111 The constitutionality of inquisitorial practices has also been
called into question,112 and traditional inquisitorialism has been
said to be unduly threatening to subjective, if not objective,
justice.113 Because I have dealt with these concerns at length in
other works, I will not repeat those arguments here. However, this
Part does identify and briefly respond to three sets of criticisms,
organized under the headings of constitutional, accuracy, and imple-
mentation objections. In the course of doing so, this Part of the
Article provides more detail as to how a preventively-oriented, in-
quisitorial regime would work.
A. Constitutional Objections
While the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment has been construed to require some degree of proportionality,
it does not dictate that retributivism drive sentencing policy, at
least outside of the death penalty context.114 Even in the latter
setting, the Supreme Court has routinely sanctioned sentences
based primarily or solely on dangerousness.115 At the same time,
indeterminate sentencing should not be immune from constitutional
monitoring. I have argued that, although such sentencing is not
111. But see Michael M. OHear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (2011) (arguing that indeterminate sentencings
apparent conflict with retributivism rests largely on the mistaken premise that retributivism
necessarily and inflexibly demands that the same degree of suffering be imposed on all crim-
inals who are guilty of the same offense, and that release can be earned in a way consistent
with an expanded view of retributivism).
112. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (Our Constitution ... do[es] not
admit the contention that facts are better discovered by judicial inquisition than by adver-
sarial testing before a jury.). 
113. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 81-96 (1975) (reporting laboratory research concluding that participants preferred
a process in which they controlled the development and selection of facts, to one where an
independent officer did so).
114. See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 903 (2011) (describing the Courts deliberate effort
to limit proportionality review to a narrow range of cases, almost all of which involve the
death penalty).
115. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 277 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (upholding a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing threat to society as an aggravating factor justifying a death sentence) (citation
omitted).
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unconstitutional, the Due Process Clause requires that the nature
and duration of an indeterminate disposition be roughly proportion-
al to the offenders riskmeasured in terms of both its probability
and magnitude of harmand must also be the least drastic method
of dealing with that risk.116 While a defendant would probably be
estopped from attacking an accepted offer on those grounds, an of-
fender serving an unbargained-for sentence should be able to mount
a due process challenge to unduly prolonged or restrictive sentences.
A separate constitutional question is whether the risk-needs
assessment that forms the basis for preventive justice depends on
suspect criteria. Although no structured assessment instrument
currently in use relies on race as a risk factor, some of these instru-
ments put considerable weight on age and gender (with youth and
maleness elevating risk). The best instruments also look at socio-
economic status, employment and marital history, diagnosis (for
example, psychopathy and substance abuse), the presence of anti-
social attitudes and acquaintances, and a host of other factors that
are immutable, have little to do with blameworthiness, or both.117 A
number of writers have suggested that reliance on these factors is
unconstitutional or in some other way illegitimate.118
116. See Slobogin, supra note 60, at 1134-40 (citing, inter alia, the holding in Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), that due process requires that confinement bear a
reasonable relation to the governments purpose). 
117. See generally HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT (Randy K. Otto & Kevin S.
Douglas eds., 2010) (describing numerous actuarial and structured risk assessment instru-
ments); Michael S. Caudy et al., How Well Do Dynamic Needs Predict Recidivism? Implica-
tions for Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction, 41 J. CRIM. JUST. 458, 459 (2013) (noting that
most risk evaluations consider antisocial attitudes, antisocial associates, antisocial per-
sonalities, and criminal history, and that many also consider substance abuse, family
characteristics, education, employment, and lack of prosocial leisure or recreation).
118. For the strongest argument for this proposition, see Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 821-41
(2014) (arguing that risk assessment instruments that include age, gender, and socioeconomic
factors as risk factors violate equal protection). Starr also argues that many of these factors
can be proxies for race. See id. at 838 ([T]he socioeconomic and family variables that [risk
instruments] include are highly correlated with race, as is criminal history, so they are likely
to have a racially disparate impact.). But recent research suggests that, with at least some
instruments, the latter outcome is unlikely. See Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Lowenkamp,
Risk, Race & Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact 37 (2015), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2687339 [https://perma.cc/NLY5-DSJL] (describing an analysis of a widely used risk
assessment instrument and concluding that risk assessment instruments can be free of
predictive bias and can be associated with small mean score differences by race).
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The constitutional argument is difficult to make. Eliminating con-
sideration of those risk (and protective) factors that have proven
predictive validity would seriously curtail the efficacy of the risk
assessment and undermine the states interest in carrying out its
prevention objective.119 Thus, even if use of age and gender in this
context implicates equal protection analysis,120 and even if one ac-
cepts the doctrinally suspect proposition that use of socioeconomic
considerations is entitled to heightened scrutiny,121 reliance on such
factors is justified when it serves the compelling state interest of
efficiently allocating resources aimed at protecting the public from
serious criminal acts.122 Risk assessment that allows identification
of low risk offenders might also help achieve another important
aimthe mitigation of mass incarcerationbut only if it is not arbi-
trarily circumscribed.123
The subconstitutional concerns that punishment in a preventive
regime is based on conditions over which a person has little or no
control and on generalizations that fail to take into account individ-
ual differences are also overblown.124 As I have noted elsewhere,
119. Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 281 (2015) (Simply discarding politically sensitive variables and their
proxies from risk-needs tools can critically jeopardize predictive ability.); see also id. at 247-
50 (debunking on several grounds the one study Professor Starr relied upon to support the
opposite contention).
120. Discrimination based on gender is subject to intermediate scrutiny. United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996). To date, discrimination based on age receives rational
basis review. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
121. Professor Starr cites Supreme Court and lower court cases that indicate that basing
a criminal justice decision on indigency alone is unconstitutional. Starr, supra note 118, at
830-36. But she neglects Supreme Court and lower court cases that require intentional
discrimination, that reject proxy analysis, that allow decisions to be based on stereotypes
about gender, and that, in any event, at most require rational basis review for all the listed
categories except gender. See Hamilton, supra note 119, at 247-50 (elaborating on these
responses to Professor Starrs argument).
122. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 32 (Am. Bar Assn ed., 2009)
(1881) (stating that crime prevention is the chief and only universal purpose of punishment).
123. John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10.20), http://www.
annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-021815-092945 [https://perma.cc/2DSP-
8QWV] (Political advocates who agree on little else have coalesced in proposing that the way
to unwind mass incarceration in America without jeopardizing the countrys historically low
crime rate is to make risk assessment much more prominent in sentencing criminal offend-
ers.).
124. See Daniel S. Goodman, Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 499, 508-16 (1987) (arguing that, in the criminal justice system, reliance on factors
2016] PLEA BARGAINING AND THE GOALS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1537
risk-based dispositions are ultimately based on a prediction of
what a person will do, not what he or she is. Immutable risk fac-
tors are merely evidence of future conduct, in the same way that
various pieces of circumstantial evidence that are not blameworthy
in themselvesfor example, presence near the scene of the crime or
possession of a weaponcan lead to a finding of guilt.125 Further-
more, the one category of risk factors that most opponents of modern
risk assessment would permit predictors to considercriminal his-
toryis also closely associated with socioeconomic status and, yes,
race.126 Short of abandoning risk assessment entirely, the constitu-
tional and ethical issues are unavoidable.
Finally, concern about the generalizations upon which risk
assessment relies can and should be alleviated by two aspects of
well-run risk management programs: individuals should always be
able to present evidence of protective factors that are not considered
in the risk assessment protocol,127 and assessment of risk should be
continuous, taking into account participation in rehabilitation ef-
forts and the like.128 In a truly indeterminate regime, any given risk
assessment can only enhance a sentence for a short period of time. 
Thus, the Constitution does not prohibit indeterminate sentenc-
ing. Nor should it pose an impediment to the judiciary-oriented
procedural proposals made here. On several occasions, the Supreme
Court has maintained that our system of justice is adversarial
over which a person has no control is impermissible); see also John Monahan, A Jurisprudence
of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L.
REV. 391, 427-28 (2006) (same); Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual
Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 706-20 (2007) (same).
125. See Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THEOXFORDHANDBOOK OFSENTENCING
AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 81, at 196, 201-02.
126. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating
Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2468 (1996) (noting the presumptions of
guilt that attach because of class and race). Indeed, consideration of criminal history alone
may even exacerbate the socioeconomic and racialized aspects of punishment. Modern risk
assessment requires much more individualization. See supra text accompanying note 117.
127. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE,
AND SPECULATION INADJUDICATINGCULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 125-26 (2007) (making
the argument for an evidentiary rule allowing the individual to control when individualized
risk factors may be introduced, analogizing to the character evidence rule).
128. See Slobogin, supra note 60, at 1149-51 (arguing that periodic review is consti-
tutionally required).
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rather than inquisitorial.129 But those references were made in sup-
port of adversarial guarantees such as the right of confrontation and
the right to remain silent;130 the Court has never addressed the role
of the judge during adjudication.131 In any event, the proposed
regime retains confrontation and compulsory process rights, and, as
under the present system, allows the defendant to remain silent
without repercussions, at least if he or she is not interested in a
deal.132 If anything, the proposed hybrid regime enhances trial rights
like the right of confrontation by ensuring that a trial occurs in
every case. The key difference is that the judge is authorized to
confront the witnesses first, and can compel the appearance of wit-
nesses and the production of evidence that neither party wants to
introduce.133
B. Accuracy Objections
Assessments of risk and treatability, which are crucial to preven-
tive justice, are far from perfect.134 However, the development of
actuarially-based risk assessment instruments has appreciably im-
proved our ability to separate out high-risk and low-risk individuals
129. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1642-56
(2009) (describing cases in which the Court has supported the confrontational model and
rejected inquisitorialism).
130. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004) (stating that hearsay was the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
7 (1964) (stating that because the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial,
not inquisitorial, ... the Fifth Amendment is its essential mainstay).
131. Some lower courts have expressed concern about judicial involvement in questioning
witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979) ([G]reat care
must be taken by a judge to always be calmly judicial, dispassionate and impartial.) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, judicial questioning is permitted by the rules of evidence.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 614(b) (The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the
witness.). Moreover, in the plea bargaining context, the danger of a jury misreading the judge
is non-existent.
132. Although I do not delve into the issue here, as part of the move toward inquisitorial-
ism I have defended elimination of the right to silence at trial as well, assuming impeachment
based on prior crimes is prohibited. See Slobogin, supra note 63, at 727-30.
133. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing
Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 367 (1977). On whether the judge could or would
do so without access to the prosecutors dossier, as occurs in Europe, see Slobogin, supra note
63, at 719-20 (arguing that a dossier-driven process is possible in the United States).
134. For a summary of research see Slobogin, supra note 125, at 200-01.
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and identify ways of reducing risk.135 The accuracy question should
also be asked comparatively. Culpability calibrations, which are
essential to a well-run retributivist regime, particularly so under
consequential retributivism, are mere guesswork;136 moreover, once
made, they definitively determine the sentence.137 Risk assessment,
by contrast, at least attempts to be scientifically-based, is robustly
testable, and, in an indeterminate regime, would be subject to
periodic review so that mistakes or changes in risk can be discov-
ered.
Some have resisted actuarially-oriented assessments of risk and
treatment needs on the ground that making such predictions about
individuals based on data about groups is incoherent or impossi-
ble.138 That contention, which suggests that all actuarial-type
reasoning is off-base, has been roundly rebutted as a matter of sta-
tistical inference.139 It is also contradicted by research that routinely
135. Id. at 200 (noting that false positive rates using unstructured evaluation techniques
tend to be over 50 percent, whereas more recent studies, usually evaluating the accuracy of
actuarial or structured professional judgment protocols, produce false positive rates between
15 and 50 percent).
136. The best effort at this calibration, in ordinal terms, comes from Paul Robinson and his
colleagues. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in
Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1848-65 (2007) (showing high reliability in
laypersons rankings of various crimes). But agreement about the appropriate sentence to
impose for a given crime is much harder to come by, even with respect to the most common
crimes. See Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in its Place,
65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 94-96 (2013) (showing low consensus on punishment level for the same
crimes depicted in Robinson & Kurzban, supra).
137. In some regimes that are ostensibly retributivist, sentences can be reduced through
earning good time credits or second look judicial review after a certain period of time. See
Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About Second Look and Other
Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L.
REV. 859, 861 (2011) (describing three such options considered by the drafters of the revision
to the MPCs sentencing provisions). But such credits are automatic assuming good behavior
and thus, in effect, are determined at the front end, and second look reviews are rare.
138. See David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limitations of Diagnostic Precision and
Predictive Utility in the Individual Case: A Challenge for Forensic Practice, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 259, 272 (2010) ([I]t is clear that predictions of future offending cannot be achieved,
with any degree of confidence, in the individual case.); Stephen Hart, Evidence-Based
Assessment of Risk for Sexual Violence, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 143, 164 (2009) (It is impossi-
ble to directly measure (using some technology) or calculate (using some natural law) the
specific probability or absolute likelihood that a particular offender will commit ... violence,
and even impossible to estimate this risk with any reasonable degree of scientific or
professional certainty.).
139. R. Karl Hanson & Philip D. Howard, Individual Confidence Intervals Do Not Inform
Decision-Makers About the Accuracy of Risk Assessment Evaluations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
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finds actuarial prediction to be superior to individualized clinical
prediction.140 Perhaps most importantly, clinical prediction, based
on an experts idiosyncratic choice of risk factors, is as prone to
reliance on stereotypes about gender, age, and socioeconomic factors
as actuarial prediction;141 the primary difference is that actuarial
assessment rests on empirical findings and, because it relies on
structured instruments, is generally much more accessible to
outside observers.
While claims that risk-needs assessments are untenable can thus
be parried, the accuracy objection does dictate that the best risk-
needs assessment instruments be used. The recent trend toward
evidence-based correctional policy, while consistent with a preven-
tive regime, has been hasty. Some instruments are poorly validated,
are focused solely on risk to the exclusion of needs, or are incompe-
tently administered.142 The hybrid-inquisitorial procedure advocated
here will make risk assessment more transparent and subject it to
judicial and adversarial testing on a routine basis. That process
should appreciably improve the risk assessment enterprise.
A related accuracy concern has to do with the parole board. One
of the reasons indeterminate sentencing fell into disfavor was the
275, 277 (2010) (Cooke & Michies and Harts declaration, [i]f true ... would be a serious
challenge to the applicability of any empirically based risk procedure to any individual for
anything.); Peter B. Imrey & A. Philip Dawid, A Commentary on Statistical Assessment of
Violence Recidivism Risk, 2 STAT. & PUB. POLY 1, 1 (2015) (finding the arguments of Hart et
al. seriously mistaken in many particulars and stating that the arguments should play no
role in reasoned discussions about violence recidivism risk assessment).
140. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with
Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM.CRIM.L.REV. 1443, 1455-58
(2003).
141. Barbara Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1427 (1979) (Although the
clinician need not identify in advance the characteristics he will regard as salient, he must
nevertheless evaluate the applicant on the basis of a finite number of salient characteristics,
and thus, like the statistical decisionmaker, he treats the application as a member of a class
defined by those characteristics.).
142. See Hamilton, supra note 119, at 283 (noting complaints about certain risk instru-
ments having been normed on foreign samples yet indiscriminately scored on domestic
offenders, high rates of false positives, exaggerations of predictive validity measures, evidence
of adversarial bias in scoring, the lack of standardization in sufficiently training raters, and
the inherent inability of group-based statistics to permit individualized predictions of risk);
Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 41 (2011) ([E]ven well-validated instruments offer
little direct validity data for the treatment-relevant variables they include.).
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documented tendency of parole boards to act in a biased, arbitrary
manner.143 However, if parole boards are conceived of as part of the
risk management team, they would look and act quite differently
than the parole boards of the mid-twentieth century. Not only would
they rely on modern risk assessment, but they would also be com-
posed primarily of experts in risk-needs assessment, rather than
laypeople and correctional officials.144
Finally, with respect to concerns about the procedure proposed in
this Article, inquisitorial trial procedures are hard to fault from an
accuracy perspective. It is well-established that inquisitorial pro-
cedures are more likely to achieve what researchers have called
objective justicethat is, results that are closer to ground truth
because they reduce the influence of bias and misdirection that
adversarialism seems to encourage.145 As indicated earlier, the main
criticism of inquisitorialism has instead been that it falls short in
ensuring subjective justice, because the litigants feel they are not
given sufficient voice. However, research in both the laboratory and
the field indicates that the type of hybrid procedure proposed here,
in which the parties retain the opportunity to present evidence, is
at least as likely to satisfy the subjective perceptions of the litigants
as a purely adversarial regime.146
143. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L.REV. 175, 187
(2005) (Parole release has historically been an unstructured and wildly discretionary power,
subject to the same kinds of irrationalities and abuses that afflict old-style, fully discretionary
judicial sentencing on the front end.); Kevin R. Reitz, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom
of Parole Release Authority, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 199, 228 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2004) (recognizing that parole boards have a history of poor process and patronage
appointments).
144. See Stefan J. Bing, Note, Reconsidering State Parole Board Membership Requirements
in Light of Model Penal Code Sentencing Revisions, 100 KY. L.J. 871, 888 (2012) (arguing that,
given the movement toward evidence-based sentences, parole boards should include social
scientists in the fields of sociology, psychology, or statistics).
145. See Slobogin, supra note 63, at 711-12 (reporting research showing that the inquisi-
torial system is less likely to create biased evidence, and noting that even THIBAUT & WALKER,
supra note 113, concluded that an autocratic procedure is most likely to produce truth).
146. Id. at 710-11; see also Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-
Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 175 (2005) (summarizing
research and concluding that autocratic, inquisitorial-style procedures (with less process
control than the adversarial model) are rated more favorably when they provide opportunities
for voice). 
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C. Implementation Objections
Could preventive justice and inquisitorial adjudication become a
reality? There are grounds for optimism on this score. As evidenced
by the original MPC, this country has had considerable experience
with indeterminate sentencing, and even today a majority of states
have retained at least some version of it, most with parole boards in
place.147 Mandatory minimum and maximum sentences would have
to be abolished, and truth-in-sentencing rules eliminated. These are
significant moves, but they are already underway in some states.148
And versions of inquisitorialism are prevalent not only in Europe
but in pockets of this country as well.149
The more difficult implementation issue might be acquiring
the right personnel to run the system. Risk-needs assessments,
done correctly, require extensive training and expertise.150 Risk
managementwhether it takes place in an institution or the
communityalso requires significant investment in staff and
resources.151 Consider, for instance, this description of the require-
ments for a prototypical drug court, from the Department of Justice:
147. Chanenson, supra note 143, at 186-87 (Although discretionary parole release is large-
ly off the national sentencing reform radar, it remains a vital part of American criminal
justice. In fact, indeterminate sentencing regimesthat is, systems with discretionary parole
releasecontinue to be the most common approach to sentencing in the United States.)
(footnotes omitted).
148. See Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1602-03 (2012) (recounting efforts to eliminate mandatory
minima, increase diversion, and promote early release).
149. Perhaps the most obvious example is the juvenile court, at least as originally con-
ceived. See DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL
COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38-39 (1991); see also infra text
accompanying notes 150-52.
150. See Patricia Harris, What Community Supervision Officers Need to Know About
Actuarial Risk Assessment and Clinical Judgment, 70 FED.PROBATION 8, 13 (2006) (describing
ways training can improve risk assessments).
151. For instance, one of the most successful community-based risk management programs,
multisystemic therapy (MST), is an intensive family- and community-based treatment that
addresses the multiple determinants of serious antisocial behavior in juvenile offenders and
requires therapists to develop [i]ntervention strategies [that] are integrated into a social
ecological context and include strategic family therapy, structural family therapy, behavioral
parent training, and cognitive behavior therapies. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R.
FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 136-37 (2011) (reprinting
description from MST website).
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(1) Integration of ... treatment with justice system case process-
ing; (2) Use of a nonadversarial approach, in which prosecution
and defense promote public safety while protecting the right of
the accused to due process; (3) Early identification and prompt
placement of eligible participants; (4) Access to a continuum of
treatment, rehabilitation, and related services; (5) Frequent
testing [to ensure the treatment program is being followed]; (6)
A coordinated strategy among judge, prosecution, defense, and
treatment providers to govern offender compliance; (7) Ongoing
judicial interaction with each participant; (8) Monitoring and
evaluation to measure achievement of program goals and gauge
effectiveness; (9) Continuing interdisciplinary education to pro-
mote effective planning, implementation, and operation; and (10)
Partnerships with public agencies and community-based
organizations to generate local support and enhance drug court
effectiveness.152
Drug courts of this sort have been found to be effective at reducing
recidivism,153 as have many other modern correctional programs,
contrary to the 1970s mantra that nothing works.154 But the
success of such programs depends heavily on the right treatment
personnel and the right institutional arrangements. Certainly, the
current operation of the parole systemwhether it involves release
decision making, parolee supervision, or when and how parole is
revokedleaves much to be desired.155
152. Richard S. Gebelein, The Rebirth of Rehabilitation: Promise and Perils of Drug Courts,
SENTG & CORRECTIONS, May 2000, at 3, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181412.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XS2N-KN9A] (numbering added to text).
153. 2 C. WEST HUDDLESON III ET AL., NATL DRUG CT. INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT
PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 1, 2008),http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/ndci/
PCPII1_web%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QC6-CMT7] (findingthat drug courts are a more
cost effective method of dealing with drug problems than either prison or probation); Steven
Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NATL DRUG CT. INST. REV. 10, 37-38,
47 (1998), http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/ndci/NDCR_volume1_issue1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FS38-5Y4S] (reviewing thirty evaluation reports covering twenty-four drug courts
and finding significant success at reducing repeat offending, but also noting that most of the
surveys have been somewhat ad hoc and anecdotal).
154. Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs, in
CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 293, 303 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011) (reporting
that most ... mean effect sizes represent recidivism reductions in the 20 percent range,
varying upward to nearly 40 percent). 
155. See Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887,
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Further, as number (2) above suggests, in the typical bargained
case the defense, prosecution, and judge would be part of the risk
management team. That enterprise might require lawyers to inter-
nalize a significant shift from the adversarial mindset, at least at
the pretrial stage.156 More radically, at trial the judge would no lon-
ger be the passive decision maker or referee that American judges
are today, but would take a very active role in the adjudication
process. Assumption of that role would require significant training
and reorientation if experience in Europe is any guide.157 Judges
might also find it beneficial to become involved in the bargaining
process prior to trial, as occurs in Germany and some American
states.158 Whether American judgeswho, unlike German judges,
are subject to periodic election in many jurisdictions159 would be
willing to undertake such an activist, more-transparent role in
shaping criminal dispositions is open to question.160
975 (2014) (describing the relaxation of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights at parole
revocation proceedings; the often trivial actions that can result in revocation; police abuse of
the authority to monitor parolees; and concluding that [a] solution[ ] to the harms of parole
that are detailed in this Article have to involve rethinking all of the institutions that con-
tribute to the problem).
156. See Luna, supra note 93, at 74 (describing the role of prosecutors in continental sys-
tems as judicial professionals); cf. Kara Gleckler & T.J. Oram, Comment, An Analysis of the
Constitutional Issues Implicated in Drug Courts, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 471, 512-15 (2006) (describ-
ing the differing roles of judges and lawyers in drug courts).
157. See Slobogin, supra note 63, at 719-20 (noting that [a]n inquisitional judge must be
able to plan the trial, conduct much of the questioning, and ensure that witnesses are han-
dled in as objective a fashion as possible, but also arguing, based on evidence from various
settings, that American judges are up to the task); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses
in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 517-18 (1992) ([T]he Contin-
ental system relies heavily upon the skill, motivation, discipline, and integrity of its
professional judges .... [and] high standards of selection, training, and performance.).
158. See Turner, supra note 97, at 219-20 (Germany), 238-43 (Florida), 247-52 (Con-
necticut); see also Rishi Raj Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute
Resolution Perspective, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 565, 566 (2015) (finding that judicial involvement in
bargaining is quite common in some jurisdictions).
159. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008)
([R]oughly ninety percent of state general jurisdiction judges are currently selected or
retained through an election process).
160. I take an optimistic view on this score. See Slobogin, supra note 63, at 719-20. Several
commentators have advocated various forms of more vigorous judicial involvement, at least
in plea bargaining. See, e.g., Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26
STAN. L. & POLY REV. 61, 65 (2015) (arguing for a pre-plea proceeding where, after party
presentations, the judge would indicate two sentences, one if there is an agreement and one
if the case goes to trial); Rakoff, supra note 2 (arguing that magistrate judges should hear
arguments from prosecutors and defense attorneys and make nonbinding sentencing
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Finally, a potential constitutional problem with a properly run
preventive justice system that was not flagged earlier must be
noted. If plea bargaining of the type described in this Article is to
work, expert input on the defendants risk and the type of programs
that are likely to reduce it is needed not only in parole proceedings,
but also at the pretrial stage. This sort of pre-bargain assessment
might raise Fifth Amendment issues, because the best risk and
needs assessments usually involve participation of the defendant.
But several considerations mitigate this concern. Most obviously,
when the defendant consents to an interview, which may often occur
when guilt is obvious, the Fifth Amendment could be said to be
waived. This rationale may explain why, even under current prac-
tice, several states and the federal courts permit pre-bargain reports
as a means of expediting the process.161 Self-incrimination concerns
might also be alleviated by division of bargaining and adjudication
responsibilities within the prosecutors office.162 In cases in which
bargains are sought but the Fifth Amendment remains an obstacle
to face-to-face interviews with the defendant, the relevant risk as-
sessments might have to rely on publicly available data such as
prior record, prior treatment attempts, and the like. Fortunately,
several risk assessment instruments rely solely on such informa-
tion.163
The reorientation outlined above would be difficult. But imagin-
ing a system of preventive justice and inquisitorial procedure is a
worthwhile thought experiment for a number of reasons, not the
recommendations); see also Albert Alschuler, The Trial Judges Role in Plea Bargaining, Part
I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1123-24 (1976) (arguing for an approach similar to McConkies
proposal).
161. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 808 (3d ed. 2007).
162. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874 (2009) (arguing for the segregation of
individuals who make investigative and advocacy decisions ... from those who make adjudica-
tive decisions, the latter of which should be defined to include some of the most important
prosecutorial decisions today, including charging, the acceptance of pleas, and the decision
whether or not to file substantial assistance motions).
163. See, e.g., Dana Anderson & R. Karl Hanson, Static-99: An Actuarial Tool to Assess
Risk of Sexual and Violent Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE
RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 117, at 251, 253 (listing the ten risk factors on the Static-99,
all of which ask for information that can be obtained from records). A final option is to
abandon the right to remain silent at the adjudication stage. See Slobogin, supra note 63, at
727-30.
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least of which is the serious mismatch between plea bargaining on
the one hand and retributive and adversarial justice on the other.
CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining dominates the criminal justice system, in a way
that undermines the substantive and procedural goals of our crim-
inal justice system. In Lafler v. Cooper, Justice Scalia appeared to
recognize this point:
In manyperhaps mostcountries of the world, American-
style plea bargaining is forbidden in [serious] cases ..., even for
the purpose of obtaining testimony that enables conviction of a
greater malefactor, much less for the purpose of sparing the
expense of trial....
... It presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that
effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk
by pleading guilty to a lesser offense; and for guilty defendants
it oftenperhaps usuallyresults in a sentence well below what
the law prescribes for the actual crime. But even so, we accept
plea bargaining because many believe that without it our long
and expensive process of criminal trial could not sustain the
burden imposed on it, and our system of criminal justice would
grind to a halt.164
As Justice Scalia implied, it would be more consistent with our
stated substantive ideals to abandon plea bargaining and insist on
the charge and sentence that reflect an individuals desert. But
given the realities of our crime problem, we probably must instead
resort to plea bargaining. For plea bargaining to work, there must
be a difference between the bargained-for disposition and the dis-
position that occurs when a defendant refuses to waive trial rights.
That difference cannot be justified in a retributive regime, or can
only be justified through a complicated minimization of desert as
the primary goal. In contrast, plea bargaining makes sense in a
criminal justice system oriented toward preventive justice, because
the bargain/no bargain differential focuses on different ways of
reducing risk, some of which are likely to be more attractive to
164. 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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defendants than rolling the dice on an indeterminate sentence
controlled by the parole board.
Similarly, it would be more consistent with our stated procedural
ideal to require every case to be adjudicated in front of a jury during
a public, adversarial trial. But again, our crime rates and, to use
Scalias words, our long and expensive process,165 appear to make
achievement of this ideal unrealistic. The best way to ensure that
adversarial trial rights are honored is to abandon a central tenet of
American adversarialismparty control of the evidenceand allow
judges freer rein during adjudication. With the judge in control, evi-
dence beyond the slight factual basis now offered would have to be
presented on both guilt and sentencing issues, even in cases in
which the parties have bargained away the right to jury, the right
to remain silent, and particular charges or sentences in an effort to
streamline the adjudication process. Moreover, those adversarial
rights that are not plea intrinsic, such as the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel, could never be the subject of a bargain.
Plea bargaining recognizes that, in the typical case, the principal
decision will be about disposition rather than guilt. If that is so, it
makes sense to shift criminal justice power from lawyers and juries
to experts and judges, especially if the disposition is aimed at
achieving preventive goals like rehabilitation and specific deter-
rence. Preventive justice and inquisitorialism not only can coexist
with plea bargaining, but should enhance its ability to arrive at
efficient, accurate results.
165. Id.

